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Abstract:  Why did the North-Sea folk suddenly get so rich, get so much 
cargo?  The answers seems not to be that supply was brought into equilibrium 
with demand---the curves were moving out at breakneck pace.  Reallocation is 
not the key.  Language is, with its inherent creativity.  The Bourgeois 
Revaluation of the 17th and 18th centuries brought on the modern world.  It 
1
was the Greatest Externality, and the substance of a real liberalism.  Left and 
right have long detested it, expressing their detestation nowadays in 
environmentalism.  They can stop the modern world, and in some places 
have.  The old Soviet Union was admired even by many economists---an 
instance of a “cultural contradiction of capitalism,” in which ideas permitted 
by the successes of innovation rise up to kill the innovation.  We should resist 
it.
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Chapter 32:
It Was Not Allocation, but Language
The main economic puzzle with the explanations of the Age of 
Innovation proposed so far is that they assume that, until 1750 and the wave 
of gadgets sweeping over England, opportunities for profit were simply 
ignored.  As I’ve said now repeatedly, that’s not economically reasonable.  If 
the spinning jenny was such a swell idea in 1764 C.E., why was it not in 1264, 
or 264, or for that matter in 1264 B.C.E.?  If factories extracted surplus value in 
1848, why not in 1148?  Thus the economic puzzle of the Industrial Revolution. 
The other, historical puzzle, as I’ve also noted repeatedly, is that many 
of the so-called preconditions (high savings rates, lots of international trade, 
private property, science) happened long before, and in other places than 
northwestern Europe.  Bragging, thrusting, crusading Christendom was 
notably backward compared to the great Asian empires even in 1700 and 
certainly in 1600, and quite embarrassingly so in 1500.  Imagine as a mental 
experiment that preconditions of the material sort—investment, trade, empire, 
science—do make for an industrial revolution and for the sustained 
enrichment of the poorest among us.  In that case China or India should have 
had an industrial revolution in 1600, or centuries earlier, as should Rome or 
Greece.  The historical puzzle is the temporary oddness of the lands around 
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the North Sea after, say, 1700 or 1800.  One can offer plausible offsets in the 
case of Greece or Rome, especially the slavery and misogyny that supported a 
contempt for labor, and for active, stirring, laborious men of business.  It 
might apply to China and India and the Ottoman Empire, too.  In other words, 
I am claiming, the anti-bourgeois character of society before 1700, in Europe, 
too, explains the lag.
The economic and the historical puzzles are twins.  If having lots of 
foreign trade in Britain in 1700 C.E. made for explosive opportunities for 
profitable innovation and an Industrial Revolution by 1800, and a sharp rise of 
living standards in northwestern Europe by 1900, then why did it not do so in 
China in 700 C.E. or Egypt in 1700 B.C.E.?  If security of property and other 
such legal institutions made the modern world, why did they not in 
Republican Rome or Muslim Spain?  Unless European people changed around 
1600 or 1700 in their greediness— a popular notion right down to modern 
anti-consumerism, though hardly plausible—heaps of 100-guilder or 100-
pound-sterling notes or coins cannot have sat on the ground for hundreds of 
years un-picked up.  Whatever the cause of the modern world, in other words, 
it has to be something that does not assume that earlier or non-North-Sea 
people were so stupid as to ignore strikingly good deals.  And it has to be 
unique to a very recent time and to a northwestern European place.  
Why did the North-Sea folk suddenly get so rich, get so much cargo? 
The answer can’t be that the Dutch and English (suddenly, belatedly) showed 
5
racial superiority.  A sensible answer has to honor the Dutch and English 
around 1700, but not in the same breath dishonor the rest of humanity, 
including in the dishonor the earlier Dutch and English.  After all, the rest 
elsewhere caught on to the North-Sea routine pretty quickly once it had been 
invented.  If they happened to move to Holland or Britain or America they did 
well, whatever their genes.  And at home they often nourished their own, if 
constrained, traditions of bourgeois virtue.  In the end people in Asia and 
Africa and all over, in Taiwan and Botswana and Chile, learned pretty quickly 
to perform the northwestern European trick.  But the trick could not have 
consisted of an open opportunity lying around all over the place, unused even 
in England for centuries, such as the routine taking of opportunities for profit 
from digging a canal or from sending a ship to Africa—that would violate 
economics just as Euro-centrism violates history.
      *       *       *       *
I admit the danger in the argument here, the Fallacy of the 
Immeasurable Residue.  It is not entirely cogent to keep measuring causes, 
finding the measurable ones to be small, and then concluding that The Cause 
Our Author So Persuasively Proposes must be true, though hard to measure. 
The method of knocking off contrary hypotheses, I said, is what John Stuart 
Mill recommended in his System of Logic, and is the admired practice in 
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physical and biological sciences.  But it is biased towards the immeasurable—
witness string theory in physics, or for that matter Newton’s anti-Aristotelian 
but question-begging terminology of “gravity” as a force, measurable in result 
but not in cause.  As Mill wrote, the Method of Residues works “provided we 
are certain that [in the present case, a rhetorical change] is the only antecedent 
to which [the Industrial Revolution] can be referred.  But as we can never be 
quite certain of this, the evidence from [the method] is not complete.”1  What 
may be missing is an unnoticed but still material and measurable alternative. 
(There are immaterial and measurable causes, too, by the way: it is another of 
the numerous materialist prejudices floating in the minds of many historians 
and social scientists in the twentieth century that there aren’t any.  Opinion, 
for instance, is measurable—better measured in many cases, for example, than 
pot-of-pleasure “happiness.”)  Theists have often made the similar tactical 
error of positing a God of Gaps, supposing on the eve of the discovery of 
evolution by natural selection, for example, that the complexity of, say, the 
astonishing and delicate machinery of the eye implies an unexplained gap in 
materialist explanations, and there an eye- (and watch-) making God.2  Like 
the unlucky theists, maybe I have overlooked some material cause that in 
contrast all the ones I have here examined, separately or in combination, 
1   Mill 1843, p. 464.
2  Collins 2007 93, 95, 193-195, 204.
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actually explains the factor of 2 or 16 or 100.  I’m very willing to concede the 
scientific point—if some materialist can find a material cause that works.  I 
have little optimism that she will succeed, having myself tried them 
repeatedly since 1966 and having found them in the end to be wanting.  As 
Emerson noted, “an idealist can never go backward to be a materialist.”3
3
3
  Essays, “The Transcendentalist,” p. 1.
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A piling up of rejected alternatives, all of the same re-allocative 
character, does suggest by sober scientific criteria that we may be looking in 
the wrong place—perhaps under the lamppost of static economics, or under a 
somewhat grander lamppost of a dynamics depending on statics, or under the 
grandest lamppost discovered so far, of a non-linear dynamics of chaos theory. 
Perhaps we are looking in such places not because the evidence leads us to 
them but on account of the excellent mathematical light shining under all 
these impressively ornamented lampposts.  Yet one after another of the 
proffered material explanations has failed.  No believable case can be made 
that adding them all together would change much, or that other countries and 
other times did not have equally favorable material conjunctures—not if we 
are trying to explain the unprecedented factors of growing production per 
head.  
9
The problem with all the economistic explanations lies deep within 
classical and most of subsequent economic thought: the conviction that 
shuffling stuff around makes us rich.  Transportation.  Reallocation. 
Information flow.  Accumulation.  As Kirzner expressed it, “for [the British 
economist flourishing in the 1930s Lionel] Robbins [and the Samuelsonians], 
economizing simply means shuffling around available resources in order to 
secure the most efficient utilization of known inputs in terms of a given 
hierarchy of ends.”4  Yet the path to the modern was not through shuffling and 
reshuffling.  It was not by the growth of foreign trade or of this or that 
industry, here or there, not by shifting weights of one or another social class. 
Nor indeed was it about reshufflings of property rights.  Nor, to speak of 
another sort of reshuffling, was it through rich people piling up more riches. 
They had always done that.  Nor was it through bosses being nasty to 
workers, or through strong countries being nasty to weak countries, and 
forcibly shuffling stuff towards the nasty and strong.  They had always done 
that, too.  Piling up bricks and money and colonies had always been routine. 
The new path was not about accumulation or theft or commercialization or 
reallocation or any other reshuffling.
It was instead about discovery and a creativity supported by novel 
words.  Previously unknown inputs were discovered (coal for steam engines; 
coke for iron), fresh hierarchies of ends were articulated (in the new political 
4
4
  Kirzner 1976, p. 79.
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economy, for example, the ends of general vs. privileged prosperity; in the 
new politics the radical end of achieving strict equality), new goods and 
services were created (black tulips, common stocks).  The new path led around 
1700 from the change in rhetoric by around 1800 and especially by around 
1900 to shocking innovations in factory machinery and in business practice.  It 
was supported and extended by shocking innovations in politics, with the 
result that as early as 1832 a few countries protected your life, liberty, and 
pursuit of innovation from progressive or conservative assault.  The result was 
a startling enrichment of our ancestors, poor though they began.  We ourselves 
are now better off than all but the richest of the ancestors were, measured by 
goods and human flourishing.
In a deep sense, in other words, the economist’s model of allocation 
does not come close to explaining the factor of sixteen.  If allocation and 
accumulation and property rights were the only causes, then previous 
centuries and other places would have experienced what Britain experienced 
17801860 and after.  Macaulay said, in a Smithian way, “We know of no 
country which, at the end of fifty years of peace, and tolerably good 
government, has been less prosperous than at the beginning of that period.”5 
Yes, agreed.  But 100 percent better off, and most particularly on the way to 
1,500 percent better off?  There had been many times of such peace before, 
with no such result as the factor of sixteen.  By 1860 “what had really 
5   Macaulay 1830, p. 183.  
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changed” writes the wise Goldstone, “was that innovation became common 
and widespread, even expected, because a British culture of innovation gave 
people the outlook and the intellectual and material [and sociological] tools to 
search for their own new ways of working.”6
To put it another way, economics in the style of Adam Smith, which is 
the mainstream of economic thinking, is about scarcity and saving and other 
Calvinistic notions.7  In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou 
return unto the ground.  We cannot have more of everything.  Grow up and 
face scarcity.  We must abstain Calvinistically from consumption today if we 
are to eat adequately tomorrow.  Or in the modern catchphrase: There Ain’t 
No Such Thing As A Free Lunch (TANSTAAFL).  
I have the greatest respect for such economics, which I acquired 
laboriously, Calvinistically from 1961 to 1981 or so, and of which I am still 
learning new uses and new tricks.  It is a great intellectual construct.  I’ve 
written whole books in its praise.  No joke.8  But the chief fact of the 
quickening of industrial growth 17801860 and its amazing aftermath in the 
Age of Innovation is that scarcity was relaxed.  It was relaxed in the long view, 
not banished in the short view by an “affluent society”—whatever the size of 
6  Goldstone 2009, p. 120.
7   Again see Nelson 1991, 2001.
8
8
  See all my writings before about 1983, and many even afterwards.
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income at any one time, more of it is scarce, and cannot be seized for 
admirable public purposes without loss.  That is what economists mean by a 
“production possibility curve.”  More Housing has always an opportunity cost 
in All Other Goods and Services.  So far Samuelsonian economics goes—and is 
correct.  But over time, taking the long view, modern economic growth has 
been a massive free lunch.  Discovery, not reshuffling, was the mechanism.  As 
Kirzner put it, entrepreneurship is not about optimal shuffling—a hired 
manager can carry out that routine.  “The incentive is to try to get something 
for nothing, if only one can see what it is that can be done.”9  A new rhetorical 
environment in the eighteenth century encouraged [literally: gave courage to] 
entrepreneurs.  As a result over the next two centuries the production 
possibility curve bulged out by a factor of sixteen, and more.
In 1871, a century after Smith, John Stuart Mill’s last edition of 
Principles of Political Economy marks the perfection of classical economics. 
Listen to Mill: “Much as the collective industry of the earth is likely to be 
increased in efficiency by the extension of science and of the industrial arts, a 
still more active source of increased cheapness of production will be found, 
probably, for some time to come, in the gradual unfolding consequences of 
Free Trade, and in the increasing scale on which Emigration and Colonization 
will be carried on.”10  Mill (whom you know I admire) was here in error.  The 
gains from trade, though statically commendable, and well worth having, 
9
9
  Kirzner 1976, p. 84.
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were trivial beside the extension of industrial arts.  The passage exhibits Mill’s 
classical obsession with the “principle of population,” a leading theme in 
economics from 1798 to 1871.  Mill, with many others, believed that the only 
way to prevent impoverishment of the working people was to restrict 
population growth.  His anxieties on this score find modern echo in the 
environmental and family limitation movements, such as China’s one-child 
policy, arising from pessimistic (and Orientalist) theorizing in the West.  The 
prudence of such a policy seems very doubtful today, and its lack of justice 
and liberty are plain.  In any case the Malthusian idea told next to nothing 
about the century to follow 1871.  The population of the United Kingdom 
increased by a factor of 1.8, yet income per head more than tripled.11  Nor did 
Mill’s classical model, as we have seen, give an altogether reasonable account 
of the century before 1871.
Mill again: “It is only in the backward countries of the world that 
increased production is still can important object: in those most advanced, 
what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one 
indispensable means is a stricter restraint on population”—still more wrong, 
in light of what in fact happened during the century before and the century 
10
1
  Mill 1871: Bk IV, ch.  ii.  l : 6.  Note his usage of the word “science,” in the older and wider 
sense of “systematic inquiry,” as in all his writings.
11  Maddison 2006, pp. 415, 419, 439, 443.
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after. 12  Mill did not anticipate the larger pie to come, so strong was the grip of 
classical economic ideas on his mind—even in 1871, even after a lifetime 
watching the pie grow larger.  He says elsewhere, “Hitherto it is questionable 
if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any 
human being,” a strange assertion to carry into the 1871 edition, with child 
labor falling, education increasing, the harvest mechanizing, and even the 
work week shortening.13
Mill was too good a classical economist, in other words, to recognize a 
phenomenon inconsistent with classical economics.  That the national income 
per head might triple in the century after 1871 in the teeth of rising population 
is not a classical possibility, and he would have seen the factor of sixteen in 
Britain from the eighteenth century down to the present as science fiction. 
And so the classicals from Smith to Mill put their faith in greater efficiency by 
way of Harberger Triangles and a more equitable distribution of income by 
way of improvements in the Poor Law.  It should be noted that Mill 
anticipated social democracy in many of his later opinions, that is, the view 
that the pie is after all relatively fixed and that we must therefore attend 
especially to distribution.  That the growth of the pie would dwarf the 
Harberger Triangles available from efficiency, or the Tawney Slices available 
12   Mill 1871 : Bk IV, ch.  vi. 2: 114.
13   Mill 1871: Bk IV, ch.  vi. 2: 116.
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from redistribution, did not fit a classical theory of political economy. 
Macaulay’s optimism of 1830 turned out to be the correct historical point: “We 
cannot absolutely prove that those are in error who tell us that society has 
reached a turning point, that we have seen our best days.  But so said all who 
came before us, and with just as much apparent reason.”14  The pessimistic and 
Calvinistic classical economists, with the pessimistic and Calvinistic and 
Romantic opponents of industrialization at the time such as Carlyle and 
Ruskin, and the Calvinistic and Malthusian opponents of modern economic 
growth nowadays, too, have come up short.
In the beginning was the word.  Free innovation led by the bourgeoisie 
became at long last respectable.  For instance, the merchants and machine 
makers and manufacturers in northwestern Europe were elevated for the first 
time to the rank of “gentlemen” (the ladies, once “women” or “wenches,” 
were carried along).  The middling sort of man came slowly to be called by the 
word previously reserved for the idle and well-born.  For that matter some of 
the gentlemanly idle and well-born, in Holland and England and Scotland and 
the British colonies, and then a few decades later even in France, took to trade 
and innovation.  Voltaire wrote in 1733 that in England “a peer’s brother does 
not think traffic is beneath him. . . .  At the time that the Earl of Orford [that is, 
Robert Walpole] governed Great Britain, his younger brother was no more 
14   Macaulay 1830, p. 186.
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than a factor in Aleppo.”15  A Swiss traveler wrote about the same time that “in 
England commerce is not looked down upon as being derogatory, as it is in 
France and Germany.  Here men of good family and even of rank may become 
merchants without losing caste.”16  He meant it literally: in France and Spain a 
nobleman caught engaging in commerce could be stripped of his rank.  The 
rule was ancient.  “In Thebes,” wrote Aristotle with evident approval, “there 
used to be a law that one who had not abstained from the market for ten years 
could not share in office.”17  Surprisingly, in their rhetoric the northwestern 
European elite began to deem a bourgeois career honorable.  During the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries at Rotterdam, Bristol, Glasgow, 
Boston, and then later at Rouen and Cologne, the younger sons of gentry and 
even of noblemen embarked at length on bourgeois careers.  And indeed the 
honorable classes in Holland and England had long viewed the improving of 
their estates as a good idea—if not going so far as to become a factor in 
Aleppo.  
15   Voltaire 1733, p. 154.  The remark is not strictly  accurate, since Walpole, though the longest-
serving prime minister in British history (1721-1742), became an Earl only after his fall from 
power in 1742 (Voltaire must have added the remark to a later edition, since the earldom did 
not exist at the time of the first edition, in 1733).  But for my purposes it will do: Walpole when 
in power was made early a Knight of the Bath, and was in other ways a member of the 
aristocracy, or at the worst the very highest ranks of the gentry.
16
1
  César de Saussure in 1727, quoted in Blanning 2007, p. 110.
17  Aristotle, Politics 1278a20-25.
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The historian Tim Blanning puts it so: “In the past it had been an axiom 
of English political theory that a virtuous polity depended on a traditional of 
civic humanism, sustained by a landed elite whose independence ensured 
their virtue”—thus Roman and neo-Roman theorizing down to Thomas 
Jefferson, and in the mid-twentieth century also certain British Tories and 
American Republicans.  By the early eighteenth century in England, though, a 
century after its emergence in the Netherlands, “there emerged a greater 
willingness to view commercial society, not as a sink of corruption but as a 
wholly legitimate sphere of private sociability.”18  The debate in the middle of 
the eighteenth century, argues John Danford, was “whether a free society is 
possible if commercial activities flourish.”19  The models on the anti-
commercial side of the debate, as Pocock and Skinner have shown, were 
Republican Rome and especially, of all nightmarish ideals, Sparta.  Thus 
Thomas More’s Utopia.  Commerce such as the Athenian and now the British 
favored would introduce “luxury and voluptuousness,” in the conventional 
phrase of the Scottish law lord Kames, as the debate reached its climax, which 
would “eradicate patriotism,” and extinguish at least ancient freedom, the 
freedom to participate.  As the Spartans vanquished Athens, so likewise some 
more vigorous nation would rise up and vanquish Britain, or at any rate stop 
18
1
  Blanning 2007, pp. 110-111.
19   Danford 2006, p. 319.  The quotation from Lord Kames (1774) is Danford’s.
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the admirably Republican “progress so flourishing . . . when patriotism is the 
ruling passion of every member.”  And the poet William Cowper in 1785: 
“Increase of power begets increase of wealth;/ Wealth luxury, and luxury 
excess.”20
Danford reads Hume as opposing such a civic humanist view, that is, 
the view that stressed “the primacy of the political.”  Commerce, said Hume, 
was good for us, and Georgian mercantilism in aid of the political was bad for 
us.  “In this denigration of political life,” writes Danford, “Hume [is] 
thoroughly modern and [seems] to agree in important respects with [the 
individualism of] Hobbes and Locke.”21   Hobbes, Locke, and Hume 
constituted “the challenge posed by early modern thinkers to the 
understanding of human nature which had been regnant for nearly two 
thousand years.”22  Danford does not claim that all we moderns now reject the 
nationalist, sacrificial, anti-luxury, classical republican view.  On the contrary, 
he says, no paradigm rules without challenge.  We can see the Spartan ideal in 
politics left and right, Green and nationalist.  Classical republicanism is alive 
and well and living in the pages of The Nation and The National Review.  In 
Germany, for example, great social distance and a deference to various 
20
2
  Cowper 1785, The Task, Book IV.
21   Danford 2006, p. 324.
22  Danford 2004, p. 325.
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pseudo- and real aristocracies persisted into recent times, with unhappy 
results.  The secularized Christianity known as socialism scorned the 
bourgeoisie in Russia, with equally unhappy results.  Still today, even in the 
strongholds of commercial prudence in America and Europe, the old models 
of priest or knight continue to shine, alongside the new model of the 
entrepreneur.  The academic expert is a new priest, the TV cop a new knight. 
The entrepreneur gets the blame—because after all she makes obscene 
amounts of money.  Some of our fictional heroes are businesspeople (Jimmy 
Stewart in “It’s a Wonderful Life”), but not many.  
By the late nineteenth century in the democracy-honoring and 
bourgeois-admiring United States, which lacked real aristocrats, the word 
“gentleman”—so called in address, if less so behind his back—became almost 
completely democratic.  It meant any adult, male, white, non-immigrant 
citizen.  Outside the old Confederacy few aristocratic gestures were admired. 
Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s court astounds the 
aristocratic rubes with industrial devices, not with knightly heroism, which on 
the contrary he thinks silly.  Outside of church, a peasant/Christian holiness 
was laughed at.  Twain spoofed Christian Science so harshly that (it is said on 
admittedly dubious authority) those mild folk are sworn to undertake to cut 
out any reprinting of the essay from public library books.  By now over 90 
percent of Americans identify themselves in surveys as part of a quasi-
gentlemanly “middle class.”  It shows up in the terminology of American 
20
elections, in which “the middle class” means virtually everybody.23  (“Don’t 
tax him./ Don’t tax me./ Tax that duke behind the tree.”)  The words assume 
that dealing and marketing and innovating is what we Americans are 
supposed to do.  Every gentleperson from truck driver to congresswoman in 
the United States thinks of herself as doing a little business, and dreams of 
novelties.  
Less so in other countries.  In a much more class-conscious Britain the 
percentage self-identifying as “middle class” in 2007 was only 37 percent, 
though well up from figures one would get in 1900.24  In France in 2004, 40 
percent replied “middle” to the question, “To which class do you have the 
feeling of belonging?”  About 23 percent in France replied “working”—high 
by American standards, if sharply down from what French (and British and 
even American) people would have said in 1904.  That in the French survey 
only 4 percent called themselves “bourgeois” reflects the unpopularity of the B-
word in modern European politics.  It would be good to revive the word and 
its associations with liberty.  But even so, note that forty percent and more of 
23   Pew Research Center 2008, p. 10.  The authors of the report, for reasons they do not state, want 
to define people who call themselves “upper middle” (19 percent) as “upper” and people who 
call themselves “lower middle” (another 19 percent) as “lower,” which is how they arrive at the 
assertion that only 53 percent identify as middle class (these being people who replied to the 
phone survey “middle” with no adjectives).  That puts Americans in the same range as British 
and French respondents.  But taking people at their self-defining word, all but the 2 percent 
pure “upper” and the 6 percent pure “lower” (and 1 percent not replying at all), use the 
middling word.  The fact is at least rhetorically interesting.
24   National Centre for Social Research 2007, p. 2.  Compare Marshall and others 1988, p. 144, 38.5 
percent identifying as middle class.
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people in rich countries call themselves middle class, if not the Marx-spoiled 
“bourgeois.”  Compare the much lower percentages one can imagine in the 
worlds of André Gide or of Stendhal, not to speak of Molière.  The change in 
rhetoric has constituted a revolution in how people view themselves and how 
they view the middle class, the Bourgeois Revaluation.  People have become 
tolerant of markets and innovation.
The argument applies to routine innovation as much as to great creative 
ideas, to Mokyr’s macro-invention as much to the micro-inventions that refine 
the inventions.  The economist Alan Kirman has pointed out to me that much 
innovation is as he puts it “generated by demand,” such as the improvement 
in the ballast-sweeping brooms on rail lines that an Australian friend of mine 
resident in Amsterdam has developed and sold to railways worldwide.  But 
such innovations depend if anything more on respect for the bourgeoisie and 
the liberty to innovate than the macro inventions.  Great geniuses forcing the 
pace of innovation like Edison or Ford might have braved contempt and 
interference better than the modest genius improving ballast-sweeping. 
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Chapter 33:
Dignity and Liberty for Ordinary People, in Short,
Were the Greatest Externalities
I have argued that the Industrial Revolution and its sequel cannot be 
explained by open opportunities such as trade or property rights lying about 
unused until taken up in the eighteenth century.  The economic theories 
depending on routines such as accumulation or imperialism, that is, can’t 
explain the factor of sixteen.  The innovation was fundamentally 
unpredictable.  If it had not been—if it was routine economic opportunities 
lying about—then it would have happened elsewhere at other times.  Hayek 
put it this way: “Nowhere is freedom more important than where our 
ignorance is greatest—at the boundaries of knowledge, . . . where no one can 
predict.”  And the greater is “our” knowledge the greater is the ignorance of 
any one of us, whether a central planner or a great scientist.  “The more men 
know,” Hayek continues, “the smaller the share of all that knowledge becomes 
that any one mind can absorb.”25  It is said that John Milton was the last man in 
Europe who had read everything—well, everything in Western European and 
certain biblical languages.  It’s been a long time since Milton.  The more social 
25   Hayek 1960, p. 26.
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knowledge there is, the more urgent it is for free arrangements to try out an 
idea in this or that way, since no one mind can predict where it will end.  No 
one in 1990 could have guessed how the internet would turn out.  Inventors 
themselves commonly do not know what use their invention will be. 
“Prediction is difficult,” said Yogi Berra, “especially about the future.” 
Thomas Edison believed his recording cylinders would be used mainly for 
office dictation.  When someone asked Orville Wright what he thought the use 
of his airplane was going to be, he replied, “Sport, mainly.”
But economists have a word for closed opportunities that can lie about 
unused, until stumbled into—“positive externalities.”  The more transparent 
word for the idea is “spillovers.”  In the jargon, a spillover or an “external 
effect” means some harm or benefit that is not paid for with money in a 
market.  Therefore it spills over from one person to another without being 
subject to market discipline, or the market signals for an opportunity.  It 
stands off the market’s stage, so to speak, hidden in the wings, unpaid and 
unheeded.  Yet it will from time to time loudly deliver its own lines, 
disrupting or advancing the play.  It has real effects, in other words, though 
not accounted for in private financial statements, and therefore not attended 
to.  
Smoke from a power plant is called a “negative externality” (like all 
masters of mysteries, the economists love jargon).  The harm caused by the 
smoke does not show up as a money cost to the power plant or to the users of 
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its electricity.  That’s why the disruption is ignored, external, offstage, unpaid. 
“Luckily,” says Charles Montgomery Burns, rubbing his hands with glee, “I 
don’t have to pay money for the privilege of dumping the radioactivity from 
my power plant into the air you breathe.  So what do I care?!”  There’s no 
market in which another person can buy the radioactivity or smoke or aircraft 
noise to stop it, expressing her distaste in money bids.  
But not all externalities or spillovers are bad, like power-plant smoke or 
aircraft noise or other dumping of by-products.  Some are good, those positive 
externalities.  Even some smoke—from leaf fires in autumn or from wood fires 
in winter—is not a harm but a benefit, at any rate to older folk remembering 
the sweet smells of 1959.  Some of us even have a loony nostalgia for the smell 
of diesel exhaust from the old London buses.  More seriously, having lots of 
educated people around is a spillover beneficial to you and to me and to many 
others, educated or not.  We do not pay fully for the educated-populace 
benefit in a market.  (We do pay in part through wages paid to educated 
workers.)  And so the uncompensated part is an externality.  You would pay a 
little if it could be arranged to get the sweet, nostalgic smell of autumn or 
winter, or of London in a late 1950s smog.  You would pay a lot to deal with 
people who can read and can calculate and can see through the more 
obviously manipulative campaign advertisements.  People routinely pay the 
big costs of migration to get from countries that do not have such positive 
externalities of education into those that do.
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A pair of positive externalities, I have been arguing, had been untried 
on a large scale until stumbled into by the United Provinces in the seventeenth 
century and by the United Kingdom imitating the bourgeois Dutch in the 
eighteenth century.  They were a new dignity for the bourgeoisie in its 
dealings and a new liberty for the bourgeoisie to innovate in economic affairs. 
Both were necessary for the modern world.  The two, when linked, appear 
even to have been sufficient, if you supply a few routine background 
conditions—having already somewhat large cities, for example, and extensive 
trade and reasonable security of property and cheap if slow riverine or coastal 
transport.  Such background conditions were widespread in the world of 1700, 
and cannot therefore be thought of as shocking Dutch and English novelties. 
China had them.  So did Japan, the Mughal Empire, the Ottoman Empire, 
northern Italy, the Hansa.  
But without the two necessary, and large scale, conditions of dignity 
and liberty for the innovating class, we would have no modern world.  Both 
were necessary.  Without the liberty to innovate no amount of new social 
prestige for the previously scorned bourgeoisie would have done the trick. 
The constitution of 1689, wrote Hume in the last volume of his The History of  
England (1754-1755), “gave such an ascendant to popular principles, as has put 
the nature of the English constitution beyond all controversy. And it may 
justly be affirmed, without any danger of exaggeration, that we, in this island, 
have ever since enjoyed. . . the most entire system of liberty that ever was 
26
known amongst mankind.”26  He perhaps overstates the case—Holland led the 
way, after all, to speak only of recent examples.  And the poor in Britain, 
though vividly aware that they were freeborn English men and women (and 
very willing in the eighteenth century to riot in aid of such a notion), had not 
yet been emancipated in politics or in wealth.  Yet Frenchmen like Voltaire 
and Montesquieu and later Tocqueville were right to emphasize the 
peculiarity of English liberties—habeas corpus, Parliamentary pre-eminence, 
and especially the ancient English security of property.  Tocqueville wrote in 
1835 that “it is above all the spirit and habits of liberty which inspire the spirit 
and habits of trade.”27  Liberty is necessary.  Merchants and manufactures 
could have been brought with full dignity into the British national elite of 
1700, with ribbands, stars, and a’ that, but had they lacked the liberty to profit 
from innovation, either in machines or in ways of doing business, nothing 
would have happened.  The French in the eighteenth century illustrate the 
problem in their state-sponsored prizes and industrial espionage, namely, that 
they did not give liberty to innovation.  In France as in Japan and the Ottoman 
Empire one had to apply to l’État for permission to open a factory. With such 
lack of liberty (and without the Dutch and then the British examples) the 
program of the French elite would have stayed as it had for centuries, namely, 
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  Hume 1754-1755, p. 531.
27   Tocqueville 1835, p. 116. 
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the preservation of the old ways, the cake of custom.  Or so at least an 
economist would claim.  
But without the new dignity for merchants and inventors, no amount of 
the liberty to innovate would have broken the old cake, either.  Or so at least a 
sociologist would claim.  The foreigners were startled by the esteem in which 
trade was held in Britain, though also noting the continuing hauteur and 
practical power of the British aristocracy.  Merchants in Japan and China were 
ranked for millennia close to night-soil men.  In Christian Europe they were 
considered for millennia the enemies of God.  Innovations were for millennia 
viewed as threats to employment.  And so the best minds went into war or 
politics or religion or bureaucracy or poetry.  Some still do, often on anti-
bourgeois grounds taught to them by the clerisy after 1848.
By adopting the respect for deal-making and innovation that 
Amsterdam and London pioneered around 1700, the modern world was born. 
Dignity and liberty still work.  The special development zone of Shenzhen in 
mainland China, a suburb of Hong Kong, went from being a small fishing 
village to an eight-million soul metropolis in two decades.  Such a feat 
required a shift in rhetoric: stop jailing millionaires and start admiring them; 
stop resisting creative destruction and start speaking well of innovation; stop 
over-regulating markets and start letting people make deals.
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In 1776 Adam Smith, who invented sociology as much as economics, 
called the new amalgam “the obvious and simple system of natural liberty.”28 
But my point, and his, is that, astonishingly, the system was not considered 
“obvious and simple” until the eighteenth century.  That’s the point of 
theorizing it as an “externality.”  In many circles to this day it still is suspect. 
You can still hear people who do not pretend to have thought very deeply 
about the matter declaring confidently that the market of course needs to be 
closely regulated, or that trade needs to be fair, or that immigration must be 
restricted, or that jobs are to be created by governmental programs, or that 
businesspeople routinely cheat, or that markets are chaotic, or that the more 
complex an economy is the more it needs government regulation, or that that 
governmental bureaucracies are always fair and efficient.  And many still 
declare that it is ever-so-much more dignified to work as a professor or a civil 
servant or another sort of non-profit employee than as someone making deals 
in the financial services industry or in the wholesale meat trade.  Such anti-
bourgeois people (many of them my good friends) do not believe the 
bourgeois axiom that a deal between two free adults has a strong presumption 
in its favor, practically and ethically and aesthetically.  They deny that 
allowing such deals and honoring their makers has resulted in the modern 
enrichment of the poor.  They think instead, against the historical evidence, 
that action by government or trade unions did it.
28
2
  Smith 1776, IV.ix.51, p. 687 (vol. II).
29
But a sufficiently large number of Europeans were converted to a 
rhetoric of bourgeois-respecting in the late seventeenth and especially in the 
eighteenth century.  Nowadays many people worldwide have come believe in 
market-guided innovation, and have learned to speak kindly of it.  The 
endlessly renewed schemes of “protection,” which seek to keep us doing what 
we have always done, have enemies they did not have in 1600.  The evidence 
has become overwhelming that letting innovation rip is the best plan for 
helping the poor—from the enrichment of poor Europeans around 1900 to the 
enrichment of poor Indians around 2000.  (One is reminded of the old joke: 
“Do I believe in infant baptism?!  I’ve seen it!”)  As early as 1641 one Lewes 
Roberts in England praised “the judicious merchant, whose labor is to profit 
himself, yet in all his actions doth therewith benefit his king, country, and 
fellow subjects.”29  Adam Smith could not have put it better.  In 1675 an 
anonymous English writer declared that “cupidity has taken the place of 
charity, and effects it after a manner which we cannot enough admire.”  Note 
the word “admire.”  He asked, “What charity will run to the Indies for 
medicines, stoop to the meanest employments, and not refuse the basest and 
most painful offices?”  Note, too, the hierarchy in which many “employments” 
are reckoned mean and base, not honorable.  A job of work in those 
hierarchical days was “service,” as in “servant.”  And yet he continued, 
29   Lewes 1641, pp. 1-2, quoted in McKeon, p. 202.
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“cupidity will perform all this without grudging,” to our collective good.30 
John Stuart Mill could not have put it better.  Dudley North, that man of 
aristocratic background enriched by a bourgeois career trading with the 
Ottomans, wrote in 1691 that “to force men to deal in any prescribed manner 
may profit some as happen to serve them; but the public gains not, because it 
is taking from one subject to give to another.31  Milton Friedman could not 
have put it better.  “I don’t know which is the more useful to the state,” wrote 
Voltaire in 1733 with heavy sarcasm,  “a well-powdered lord who knows 
precisely when the king gets up in the morning. . . or a great merchant who 
enriches his country, sends orders from his office to Surat or to Cairo, and 
contributes to the well-being of the world.”32  The emphasis was soon to shift 
from merchants to manufacturers, who also buy low and sell high.  But the 
young Robert Nozick could not have put it better.  Deals to buy spices or 
steam engines low and to sell them high were for the first time admired.  The 
admiration overturned the various versions of anti-bourgeois hierarchy which 
had so long prevailed: that deals are dirty, that the dealers are dangerous and 
disreputable, and that men of honor, such as the gentry or the mandarins, 
should of course keep them in their place.
30   Quoted in McKeon 1987 (2002), p. 197. 
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To put the historical point in the economist’s jargon, then, the new 
bourgeois liberty and the new admiration for the bourgeois life constituted 
world-making externalities.  They were not tried in earlier times or other 
places because they stood offstage, and the prevailing powers wanted them to 
stay there.  The powers could not imagine how very rich allowing onstage the 
honoring and liberating of economic innovation would make the powers 
themselves—and by the way their subjects.  No economist, for one thing, had 
stated the argument persuasively.  That economics itself is such an oddly 
modern invention lends plausibility to the case for a modern shift in rhetoric. 
The professors of Salamanca, the pamphleteers of Amsterdam and London, 
the political economists of Edinburgh were figures of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.  Nothing like their thought can be 
found earlier in Europe, and only glimmers elsewhere.  And in early times, for 
another, no stunning, whole-country examples of success from according 
dignity to the bourgeoisie and leaving it free to innovate had stood in mute 
testimony, such as Holland in the seventeenth century, or now China in the 
twenty-first.  
On the contrary, dignity and liberty for the bourgeoisie was viewed, 
until the view suddenly changed in academic circles in Spain and in 
commercial circles and Holland and then in Britain and then (in all circles) in 
the United States, as an outrageous absurdity.  Of course the bourgeoisie was 
contemptible, in Confucianism the fourth and lowest of the social classes, or in 
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Christianity the rich man of the Gospels who can scarcely enter heaven.  Of 
course the market needed to be regulated in the interest of the rich—and if not 
the rich baldly, then regulated in the interest of the continued rule of the rich 
by way of enriching some selected and favored and relatively well-off poor 
(unskilled automobile workers earning $30 an hour, high-school-graduate 
Cook-County hospital administrators earning $100,000 a year, members of 
local 881 of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 
earning more than what Wal-Mart employees are eagerly willing to work for). 
Of course people should be arrayed in a great chain of being from God to slave, 
and kept in their place, except by royal favor or state examination or Party 
membership.
My theme in short is the true liberal one of the de la Court brothers, 
Thomas Rainsborough, Dudley North, Locke, Voltaire, Hume, Turgot, 
Montesquieu, Smith, Tom Paine, Destutt de Tracy, Jefferson, Madame de Staël, 
Benjamin Constant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Charles [not Auguste] Comte, 
Charles Dunoyer, Malthus, Ricardo, Harriet Martineau, Tocqueville, Giuseppe 
Mazzini, Frédéric Bastiat, Mill, Henry Maine, Richard Cobden, Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Cavour, Johan August Gripenstedt, Herbert Spencer, Karl von 
Rotteck, Friedrich Dahlman, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, Lord Acton, Josephine 
Butler, Knut Wicksell, Luigi Einaudi, H. L. Mencken, Johan Huizinga, Frank 
Knight, Ludwig von Mises, Rose Wilder Lane, Nora Zeale Hurston, Karl 
Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich Hayek, Raymond Aron, Ronald Coase, Milton 
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Friedman, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Thomas Sowell, Julian Simon, 
Israel Kirzner, Wendy McElroy, and the young Robert Nozick.  It is the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty.  It contradicts the aristocratic 
sneering by conservatives at innovation and at the bourgeoisie, or the clerical 
sneering by progressives at markets and at the bourgeoisie.  The true-liberal 
claim is that unusual bourgeois dignity and personal liberty in northwestern 
Europe, and especially in Holland and then in Britain, made for unusual 
national wealth, by way of a Revaluation of ordinary, bourgeois life.  “The 
true end of Man, “ wrote von Humboldt expressing in 1792 the elevated form 
of the claim, “is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers 
to a complete and consistent whole.  Liberty is the grand and indispensable 
condition which the possibility of such a development presupposes.”33  Notice 
that a Kantian (and novel) respect for personhood is here combined with a 
political demand for liberty.
The conservative political theorist Tod Lindberg points out that neo-
conservatism was for a while animated by empirical studies of what did not 
work in the aspirations of post-War American liberalism—minimum wages 
that unfortunately damaged the poor, educational expenditure that 
unfortunately enriched middle–class teachers’ unions and mis-educated the 
poor, foreign aid that unfortunately enriched big men, and so forth.  But he 
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concludes that “the proper response to a mugging by reality is not the 
abandonment of liberalism, broadly construed, in favor of a pre-liberal or anti-
liberal or ‘conservative’ alternative, neo- or otherwise, but rather the 
abandonment of those elements (rife in postwar liberalism) that reality would 
not accommodate in favor of those that reality would accommodate and, 
indeed, compel.  This is our current and future politics.”34  I agree.  The 
economic history supports our opinion.
Dignity and liberty, to put the point in economic terms, were the 
Greatest Externalities.  As the historical anthropologist Alan Macfarlane writes 
in summarizing the liberal theme, “political and religious freedom seem to 
have a close association with the generation of economic wealth.”35  That is to 
put it mildly.  A notion of liberty to try novelties that in its origins was “a 
liberty,” that is, a special privilege, as in the phrase “a freeman of the City of 
London,” came by various happy accidents to be asserted by wider groups, 
and to characterize northwestern Europe and its offshoots.  At the same time a 
life in trade and manufacturing came to be a little bit honored, at more than a 
local level.  Liberty, I say again for the benefit of my libertarian colleagues, 
does not by itself suffice.  The political theorist James Otteson asserts a 
theorem that many libertarians believe: “Those countries that respect private 
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property and efficiently administer justice prosper, and those that do not do 
not.  It is as simple as that.”36  Not quite, unless the word “respect” has more 
meaning than “enforce the laws of property.”
The older aristocratic and peasant/Christian rhetorics began to be 
questioned, if never entirely abandoned.  When a bourgeois rhetoric born in 
Venice or Antwerp in the Middle Ages began to be elevated during the 
seventeenth century into an ideology, equipped with its own literature and its 
own history and its own symbolic life, no longer borrowing these from court 
or church, and came to be equipped with the muskets and cannons to deal 
peremptorily with traditional folk, the Bourgeois Era was fairly launched. 
Richard Steele, with Joseph Addison, in the Spectator 1711-1712 had provided a 
weekly reflection on bourgeois vs. gentry-aristocratic virtues.  Ten years later, 
in his play of 1722, The Conscious Lovers, Steele has Mr. Sealand (thus the range 
of merchant, from sea to land) declare, “we merchants are a species of gentry 
that have grown into the world this last century, and are as honorable, and 
almost as useful, as you landed folks, that have always thought yourselves so 
much above us.  For your trading, forsooth, is extended no farther than a load 
of hay, or a fat ox.”37  George Lillo’s embarrassingly cloying play another ten 
years later, in 1731, The London Merchant, can stand as an emblem for the 
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change—though a change always under challenge from the aristocracy and 
the clerisy and the peasantry/proletariat.  The honest merchant of the title 
(absurdly named “Thoroughgood”) declares in the first scene that “as the 
name of merchant never degrades the gentleman, so by no means does it 
exclude him.”38  The play was put on at least annually until 1818 for the 
edification of the apprentices of the City of London.  Courtesy, once confined 
literally to the court, spread to the middle class.  At the Octagon Room in Bath 
later in the century the daughters of the better merchants danced with the sons 
of the lesser gentry.  A century later the heiresses of American bankers and 
manufacturers were refreshing the fortunes of British ducal families.
The dual ethical change of dignity and of liberty for ordinary bourgeois 
life led to a reign of sense and sensibility from which we are still benefitting. 
Its virtues are commercial prudence and family love, combined in the self-
defined middle class with an almost insane inventive courage fueled by hope, 
protected in its politics by faith and temperance, and by a just improvement in 
the condition of the other, working classes—the ancestors of all the rest of us, 
to say it again—who themselves at last came to partake of the citizenly, 
bourgeois dignity of a vote, a house, an education, and became themselves 
“gentlemanly” middle class.
Thus Norwegian immigrants to the upper Midwest read a comic strip 
drawn by Peter Rosendahl from 1919 to 1935 in their community newspaper, 
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Decorah-Posten, concerning the adventures of Han Ola and Han Per (“Han” 
means “Him,” in the sarcastic sense of “Himself,” “His Nibs”).  One of the 
running jokes is Per’s obsessive inventiveness, sometimes a crazy reuse of 
older technologies.  During the life of the strip he tries out with disastrous 
effect fully sixty new machines, the editor of a collection of the cartoons notes, 
“invented (or bought) by Per.  Rosendahl presents him as the undying 
optimist, trying in every way possible to mechanize not only the outdoor work 
of the farmer but also the indoor work of his wife.”39  Thus in 1927:
It is all very American, as the characters keep saying.  People in the Bourgeois 
Era were free to dream of innovation, and found the attempt dignified.  Even 
fools were free thus to dream.  They found their dignity, and their 
comeuppance, in comical attempts at innovation.
The rhetorical explanation for such a historically unique madness seems 
to cohere within itself and to correspond with the facts better than the 
materialist alternatives from left or right.  
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Chapter 34:
They Warrant Not Political or Environmental 
Pessimism, but an Amiable Optimism
The economist Bryan Caplan has argued recently that the economist 
and the citizen disagree on four points.40  The economist says that: markets 
work well because of profits, foreigners deserve as much ethical weight as we 
do, production not “jobs” is the point, and things are getting better and better. 
The average citizen believes on the contrary that the food market needs close 
regulation (the discipline of publicity and profit does not suffice), that 
protection against the “flood” of Chinese goods is an ethically justified idea, 
that a football stadium “generating jobs” must be a good idea, too, and that 
the sky is always falling.  
I would add a fifth disagreement.  The average citizen does not realize 
that her paid work is beneficial to others.  She therefore believes that only 
charity or volunteer work “pays something back to the community.”  The 
economist, who looks at the economy from the eighth floor, sees markets and 
innovation as enormous engines of (unintended) altruism.  We do good by 
doing well.  As Smith famously put it in 1776, “As every individual, therefore, 
endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital . . . that its produce 
40    Caplan 2007, Chapter 2, “Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics.”
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may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to render the 
annual revenue of the society as great as he can.  He generally, indeed, neither 
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting 
it. . . .  He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it.  By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it.  I have never known much good 
done by those who affected to trade for the public good.”41
Caplan argues that an economy governed on Citizen Principles will 
impoverish the citizens.  He worries, as many have since Tocqueville and 
Bastiat and before, that a democratic politics can lead to disastrously 
protectionist and redistributive policies, as in Peron’s Argentina.  He’s right.  It 
is sadly true that democratic politics unprotected by a rhetoric of free trade 
and creative destruction can ruin economies.  (Democracy is thus the worst 
system—except for all those others that have been tried from time to time.) 
Every agricultural economy until Holland and England and the English 
American Colonies was governed on a similarly self-destructive theory 
(though nothing like democratic).  The governing theory was the Aristocratic 
Principle that most people exist for the comfort of a small group of lords and 
priests and kings.  Bizarrely, the Aristocratic policy and the Citizen policy 
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closely resemble each other in what they recommend.  Against the positive-
sum theory of the bourgeoisie they advocate expropriation of profit and the 
close regulation of markets, xenophobia, irrational projects of public works, 
protectionism amounting to staying forever in the same job, and a grim zero-
sum belief that one person’s or one country’s gain is another’s loss—and that 
only charity therefore can help the poor.  
The point here is that brief reign of the entirely new and more genial 
Bourgeois Economist’s Principles led to the modern world.  Yet in many 
countries the civic religion recommended by the clerisy remains a version of 
the Citizen or the Aristocratic policy—stubbornly anti-capitalist, protectionist, 
anti-technological, allied with anti-Americanism.  French thinkers of the 1960s, 
for example, wrote elaborate books on the economy without reading any 
books on non-Marxist economics, and little enough of Marx.  Gilles Deleuze, 
Jean Baudrillard, Georges Bataille, and other worthies talked about the 
economy without an acquaintance with the best that had been thought and 
written about it, excepting a bit of Marx and Engels and Gramsci.  The practice 
persists in university departments of the humanities worldwide.  
And therefore it persists in a good deal of teaching worldwide.  The 
required texts for French secondary-school students of social sciences, for 
example, three volumes called Histoire du XXe siècle (2005), declares that 
“economic growth imposes a hectic form of life, producing overwork, stress, 
nervous depression, cardiovascular disease, and, according to some, even the 
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development of cancer.”42  Such an assertion contradicts the experience of the 
hundreds of millions of bourgeois and working-class Westerners, whose lives 
are spent in education up to their early-20s, and in retirement to a life of 
leisure twenty years longer than the life expectancy of their grandparents by 
their early 60s (or as early as age 50 if they are engine drivers on the French 
railways; and age 55 if they are managers).  In 1910 a job working 60 hours a 
week in a factory spinning cotton in Lille might just possibly have been more 
stressful than one nowadays working 35 hours a week as a computer 
salesperson in Paris, or even a train driver.  And before that, in 1810, a factory 
job in Lille just might have seemed less in the way of overwork and nervous 
depression than farm work west of Puy-de-Dôme in the Auvergne, with no 
work at all in late winter and hectic harvests and endless threshing, and the 
children starving in April.  At any rate people did move from the farm in the 
Auvergne to the factory in Lille, with alacrity, and later a smaller distance to 
the Michelin factory.  And then they did move, avec plaisir, from the factories 
to computer sales in Paris or to driving the Train à Grande Vitesse.  
Recent decades, the French school text admits, have witnessed 
“doubled wealth”—but also “doubled unemployment, poverty, and exclusion, 
whose ill effects constitute the background for a profound social malaise.”  Yet 
the unemployment in France, and the barring for example of Muslims from 
wealth, might perhaps be caused not by “American” capitalism but by 
42   Theil 2008, from which subsequent quotations are also drawn.
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exclusive elite education in France, and by segregation of the Muslims in Le-
Corbusier-inspired high-rise concentration camps around Paris far from 
factories, and by heavy regulation of the terms of employment—for example, 
the near impossibility of firing someone in France once she has miraculously 
achieved a job.  France ranked in 2006, according to the World Bank, 144th out 
of 178 countries in ease of employing workers.  Germany, also then with a 
high unemployment rate, was 137th and South Africa, with an appalling 
unemployment rate (but employment laws imitated from Germany), 91st.  This 
against low-unemployment countries such as the UK (21st) and the US (1st). 43   
Capitalism, according to the French instructors of the young, is 
“brutal,” “savage,” and worst of all (wait for it) “American.”  Globalized 
capitalism is said to be much worse, for example, than those splendid 
examples of thoroughgoing socialism covering a quarter of the globe in 1970 
from Cuba to North Vietnam.  Many on the American left have agreed with 
their overseas comrades, and would advocate still, as the French 
schoolteachers put it “the regulation of capitalism on a global scale”—retrying 
yet again the glorious central-planning-with-gulags socialist experiment of 
1917-1989.  Such opinions have deep roots among the clerisy.  In 1966, at the 
height of Western optimism about the future of socialism, the United Nations 
issued an International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
43   World Bank, Doing Business (2006). 
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which did not so much as mention the right to property.44  The liberal heroes 
from Locke to Jefferson spun furiously in their graves.  
 
*          *          *         *
The new alternative to central-planning socialism is environmentalism. 
It is taught now as a civic religion in the American schools (and with an even 
more fevered rhetoric in Germany and the Netherlands), the way anti-
communism was in the American schools of the 1950s or nationalism in the 
French schools of 1890s or the great chain of being in the English schools of the 
1590s.  Freeman Dyson, no right-wing crank, wrote in the New York Review of  
Books, no right-wing rag, that “There is a worldwide secular religion which we 
may call environmentalism, holding that we are stewards of the earth, the 
despoiling the planet . . . is a sin, and that the path of righteousness is to live as 
frugally as possible.  The ethics of environmentalism are being taught to 
children . . . all over the world.  Environmentalism has replaced socialism as 
the leading secular religion.“45  The economist Robert Nelson argues that the 
American civic religion was once bourgeois economics, but has become 
44   As Marc Plattner noted in 1999, p. 6.
45   Dyson 2008, p. 45, examining sympathetically  the arguments of that ever-useful economist, 
William Nordhaus, in his book A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming 
Policies (2008).
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progressive environmentalism.46  The left has now adopted Malthus, not on 
fresh scientific evidence but on the mathematical “logic” that “resources” 
“must” be limited.  (Such evidence-free logic might be why a mechanical 
environmentalism appeals to so many physical and especially biological 
scientists.)  The left’s saint has become Malthus, not Marx.
Since 1798, however, the evidence has been no kinder to the clever 
economist-parson Malthus than to the clever journalist-philosopher Marx.  The 
economic historian Eric Jones notes that “economic history provides the 
antidote to the assumption that there is a static and readily exhaustible 
resource base.”  Yet the “fears of these kinds are hydra-headed and 
astonishingly resistant to contrary evidence.”47  The new environmental left 
has ignored the overwhelming evidence that incomes depend on human 
creativity not on natural resources, that innovation has unleashed creativity in 
resource-poor places like Japan or Hong Kong, and that the resulting high 
incomes generate a demand for a better environment.  By what might be called 
an environmental Say’s Law (“supply creates its own demand”), the creativity 
of innovation generates the supply of environmental improvement, and the 
enrichment from innovation creates the demand for the improvement by 
embourgeoisfied citizens.  It is starting to do even in China, and already has 
46
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  Nelson 2010.
47  Jones 2003, p. 58.
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done so in Europe and East Asia and the United States and other high-income 
places.  The air quality of rich cities, for example, has improved radically since 
1950.
But the hydra keeps growing new heads, against the evidence.  A 
leading spokesman for the environmental left, Paul Ehrlich, wrote in The 
Population Bomb in 1968 that “The battle to feed all of humanity is over.  In the 
1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of 
any crash programs embarked upon now.  At this late date nothing can 
prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.”48  After Ehrlich’s firm 
scientific prediction in 1968 the world death rate (and soon the birth rate) fell 
sharply.  The economist Julian Simon, who articulated the economic findings 
from the 1950s to the 1990s against the population-bombers—and famously 
won a wager with Ehrlich against the notion that we were running out of 
mineral “resources”—wrote in 1996 that the bombers “are reduced to saying 
that all the evidence of history [that in modern conditions population growth 
is good for people, not bad, and itself results in lower, not still higher, 
population growth] is merely ’temporary’ and must reverse ‘sometime,’ which 
is the sort of statement that is outside the canon of ordinary science.”49  
48   Ehrlich 1968., p. xi.
49   Simon 1996.
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The bombers, though, are hard to embarrass with evidence, and carry 
on railing against motherhood.  Many of them are fine scientists in their own 
fields.  They become unsteady, though, when they venture into economics. 
The paleontologist Niles Eldridge, for example, quoted in 1995 with approval 
a geologist at Columbia who had predicted in the 1960s on the basis of “simple 
measures of the volumes of the great sedimentary basins” that the world 
would run out of recoverable petroleum in the mid-1990s.50  After the 1960s, in 
fact, oil reserves grew worldwide, which by 1995 Eldridge knew.  Yet he did 
not draw the appropriate lesson in economics from the error, or from Ehrlich’s 
or the Club of Rome’s similar errors during the same era, which he also quoted 
with approval.  He didn’t see that in a world in which people respond to 
economic incentives, and to environmental worries, too, the mechanical 
extrapolation of economic variables is not going to work well.  For example, it 
didn’t from the 1960s to the 1990s.  Oil got expensive, and oil companies spent 
more to uncover previously unknown reserves.  Infant mortality went down, 
birth control cheapened, and mothers had fewer children.  A path to a fuller 
life through education opened up, and young people took it.
In 1830 Macaulay asked, “On what principle is it that, when we see 
nothing but improvement behind us, we are to expect nothing but 
deterioration behind us?”51  On what principle indeed.  Ehrlich’s 1968 book 
50
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51   Macaulay 1830, pp. 186, 187
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sold famously, and he continued well into the new millennium to defend the 
propositions that the Green Revolution and the fall in the world’s the birth 
rate and the rise of life expectancies and such triumphs of environmental 
reversals as the banning of spray-can propellants eroding the ozone layer and 
the banning of soft coal dirtying the cities are temporary and must reverse 
sometime, and that we have seen our best days and will see nothing but 
deterioration before us.  Nonetheless, the environmental left has won the 
rhetoric.  By now for instance, without evidence or much reasoning, the debate 
is closed about such a vague and questionably ethical idea as “sustainability” 
(which entails imposing burdens on present-day poor people in aid of a 
distant future generation likely to be very much richer), just as in the 1950s the 
discussion about such a vague and questionable idea as “progressive taxation” 
was closed without evidence or much reasoning.52
The economists have long tried to provide the reasoning and evidence
—to the point where convinced environmentalists have in vexation stopped 
listening to them, so painful is the experience, and have stopped trying to 
show that the economists are wrong scientifically or ethically.  Allyn Young, 
the economist responsible for inspiring the new generation of growth theorists 
in the late twentieth century, wrote thus in 1928 (he died prematurely, and his 
influence was tenuous until recently revived): 
52   Blum and Kalven 1963.
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No analysis of the forces making for economic equilibrium, forces 
which we might say are tangential at any moment of time, will 
serve to illumine this field, for movements away from 
equilibrium, departures from previous trends, are characteristic of 
it.  Not much is to be gained by probing into it to see how 
increasing returns show themselves in the costs of individual 
firms and in the prices at which they offer their products.  . . .  The 
counterforces which are continually defeating the forces which 
make for economic equilibrium are more pervasive and more 
deeply rooted in the constitution of the modern economic system 
than we commonly realize.53
One can only agree, and affirm that such agglomerating and upscaling models 
are plausible.  My economist colleagues (and especially my future-economist 
undergraduate students) are very, very smart.  Their models properly deny, 
for example, the environmentalists’ Malthusian notion that increasing 
population results in such strong diminishing returns to inputs of labor that 
people are going to be driven by a Population Bomb back to $3 a day.  On the 
contrary, say the economists following Allyn Young (and I agree: otherwise I 
lose my union card), the natural resources that environmentalists obsess on 
are unimportant constraints in a modern world.  The “ultimate resource,” as 
the economist the late Julian Simon put it, is brain power.54  And therefore 
53
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when the world has become educated and free, and when the implacable 
populist hostility to bourgeois innovation has faded, then it is quite true that 
success breeds more success.  There develop, the economists put it, those 
“economies of scale.”  Virtuous spirals. 
Getting more people and agglomerating them into cities becomes in the 
models therefore a good thing, not bad, if the people have more going for 
them than strong backs and the ability to reproduce.  Goldstone notes that “by 
the late twentieth century, in every 20 years [over any one generation, that is] 
the number of people being born was greater than the entire population of the 
world 200 years before.”55  In each generation we have more chances of a 
Socrates, an Ibn-Khaldūn, an Admiral Zheng He, an Isaac Newton, a James 
Watt than in all generations before 1800.  Africa’s genetic diversity (all the rest 
of us came from merely 1000 or so Africans, on account of the “founder 
effect,” as the population geneticists call the falling away of lineages in small 
populations) implies that when over the next fifty years or so Africa acquires a 
European standard of living it is going to dominate world culture, producing 
ten Mozarts and ten twenty Einsteins.56  
55  Goldstone 2009, p. 17.
56
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But observe: without the dual ideas of the dignity and liberty for 
ordinary life and extraordinary innovation, no innovation is going to occur, no 
one is going to get properly educated, and we are back in the world of lives 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short (though by no means solitary)—a bomber’s 
Malthusian world in which diseconomies to labor input overwhelm economies 
of scale.
Changing social ideas, in short, explain the Industrial Revolution. 
Material and economic factors—such as trade or investment or exploitation or 
population growth or the inevitable rising of classes or the protections to 
private property—do not.  They were unchanging backgrounds, or they were 
consequences of the rhetorical change, or they were beside the point, or they 
were weak, or they had already happened long before, or they didn’t actually 
happen at the time they are supposed to have happened, or they required the 
dignity and liberty of ordinary people to have the right effect.  And it seems 
that such material events were not in turn the main causes of the ethical and 
rhetorical change itself.  On the contrary, for largely non-economic reasons, the 
prestige of a bourgeois prudence rose around 1700 in the way northwest 
European people talked, within an economic conversation still honoring a 
balance of virtues.  Economic prudence gradually came to be thought of as 
virtuous, though merely one among the virtues of a good townsperson.  
    
51
*          *         *         *
If pro-innovation ideas of the elite caused the Industrial Revolution, and 
if elite artistic and intellectual turned against innovation after 1848, as it did, 
first in nationalism and then in socialism, and then in national socialism, and 
finally in environmentalism, why didn’t the turn bring to a halt the Industrial 
Revolution?  
One reply is that a split developed between the elite and public opinion, 
in a new world in which public opinion came to matter as much as elite 
opinion. The clerical elite despises advertising and advocates central planning 
and believes we are doomed by population bombs and the destruction of the 
environment.  Other people don’t.  Many artists and at length professors 
moved to the left, and developed a socialist and at length an environmentalist 
rhetoric.  Others of them moved to the right, and developed an elitist rhetoric 
against public opinion itself.  
In economic scholarship an emblem of the elite’s scorn for bourgeois 
virtues is the treatment of Friedrich Hayek, the great libertarian economist 
from Austria, a naturalized Briton.  Mention of Hayek can to this day evoke 
ignorant sneers on the left and center even of economics.  While he was still at 
the London School of Economics, an internationally famous economic 
scientist, the equal in scientific reputation at the time of J. M. Keynes, he wrote, 
in 1944, an attack on the then immensely fashionable socialism, The Road to  
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Serfdom.  In Europe no one much minded such a popular book.  But when the 
book appeared in the United States it caused a furor, partly because a long 
précis of it appeared in the vulgar and steeply right-slanting Reader’s Digest. 
In 1950 Hayek was denied an appointment in Economics at the University of 
Chicago because of The Road, and spent his years at Chicago in the Committee 
on Social Thought.
But lawyers and at length educated businesspeople adhered to the 
market values that Hayek admired, against both left and right.  In the United 
States the Eisenhower administration in the United States was an emblem of 
the split.  Elite opinion sneered at Ike and his economic policies—
Eisenhower’s cabinet was called “eight millionaires and a plumber” (the 
Secretary of Labor, Martin P. Durkin, had been the president of the plumbers’ 
union).  But the bourgeois policies stayed, and worked pretty well.  
And certain institutions and countries stored the idea of bourgeois 
dignity and liberty, which could re-emerge easily after the pessimism about 
innovation in the decades following the 1930s had passed.  Economics itself 
went through a flirtation with socialism, 1933-1981, and then returned strongly 
to its true-liberal roots.  Non-elite opinion in the United States (see Reader’s  
Digest), and to a lesser degree even welfare-state Britain, was always a 
reservoir of anti-socialist opinion.  A world without a United States might 
have permanently turned after 1945 against the Industrial Revolution, just as a 
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world without Britain and Holland would not have developed bourgeois 
dignity and liberty in the first place.57
A deeper reply is that the turn to the left, and many of the turns to the 
right, did in fact stop the Industrial Revolution, at any rate in the places where 
anti-innovation was well and truly tried.  To be sure, in 1945 it looked like 
market societies were exhausted, and that giving socialism and the welfare 
state a serious trial even in the United States was in the cards.  The best 
economists, such as Joseph Schumpeter, Alvin Hansen, John Maynard Keynes, 
Oskar Lange, Paul Samuelson, and Abba Lerner, thought at the time—with 
greater or lesser pleasure at the thought—that the world was moving from 
capitalism to socialism, whether or not the embattled democracies survived. 
Many people were impressed by the Soviet successes of the 1930s, whatever 
their human costs, and were very impressed by Stalin’s victory over Hitler. 
They could not see that in the longer run, when opportunities for imitation 
had been used up, central-planning socialism could not achieve real 
innovation.  Among students of the Soviet experience only a few, such as G. 
Warren Nutter and Alexander Gerschenkron and Abram Bergson, stood in the 
1950s and 1960s against the prevailing elite opinion that socialism in Eastern 
Europe had successfully forced fast growth superior to what capitalism would 
57
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have achieved there.58  It was later discovered that after the heroic age of the 
1930s the Soviet growth rate fell steadily, reaching such low levels in the 1980s 
that the growth of productivity relative to inputs was negative.59  Indeed, in 
1995 the World Bank economists William Easterly and Stanley Fischer 
reckoned that only in the 1950s was Soviet total factor productivity greater 
than zero.60  The capital input in Soviet ideology was treated as a free good, 
and consequently was overused, in “extensive growth.”  Build giant factories 
and full speed ahead.
Nonetheless as late as 1984 John Kenneth Galbraith was writing that 
“the Soviet system has made great material progress in recent years is evident 
both from the statistics and from the general urban scene. . . .  One sees it in 
the appearance of solid well-being of the people on the streets [Galbraith did 
not perhaps spend much time in the provinces]. . . and the general aspect of 
restaurants, theaters, and shops. . . .  Partly, the Russian system succeeds 
because, in contrast with the Western industrial economies, it makes full use of 
its manpower.”  In 1985 the great economist Paul Samuelson wrote that "what 
counts is results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system 
58   Nutter 1962; Gerschenkron 1947 and a collection of his papers on Soviet growth in 
Gerschenkron 1962; Bergson 1961.  
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has been a powerful engine for economic growth. . . . The Soviet model has 
surely demonstrated that a command economy is capable of mobilizing 
resources for rapid growth."  In 1989 Lester Thurow asked, "Can economic 
command [that is, the industrial policy that Thurow advocated] 
significantly. . . accelerate the growth process?  The remarkable performance 
of the Soviet Union suggests that it can. . . .  Today the Soviet Union is a 
country whose economic achievements bear comparison with those of the 
United States."61  When a few years later the USSR collapsed and the Soviet 
statistics were at length opened—or indeed when earlier in the early 1960s the 
crops had failed—Nutter and Gerschenkron and Bergson were proven correct. 
(Hard political turns to the right, too, could and did stop industrial 
revolutions.  Nationalist central planning in aid of Lebensraum was just as 
crippling as socialist central planning in aid of steel and farm tractors.)  
But the still deeper reply is that once the cat of dignity and liberty was 
out of the bag she was hard to stuff back in.  It was not impossible locally, as in 
Argentina or in Poland for a while, but the cat was on the prowl.  We can if we 
work hard at it kill her with war and tyranny and protectionism and anti-
innovation.  But it will be difficult.  
*          *         *         *
61
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Still, if the new rhetoric of innovation is what caused the modern world, 
then it is possible—not logically inevitable, but possible—that losing the 
ideology can lose the modern world.  In other words, the Age of Innovation 
might have led to anti-capitalist ideologies that destroyed innovation.  In fact, 
it did, in fascism and communism, and in a longer-running form in the 
clerisy’s disdain for the bourgeoisie.  All were annoyed reactions to 
innovation.  The worry is the old one of “the cultural contradictions of 
capitalism,” as Daniel Bell put it in 1978, anticipated by Schumpeter’s gloomy 
prediction in 1942—one of the darkest years of a dark decade—that the future 
lay with socialism, and Hayek’s of 1944 that the clerisy were advocating a road 
to serfdom, or Aron’s in 1955 that Marxism was the “opiate  of the 
intellectuals.”  Expressed as hope rather than worry the reversion in rhetoric 
to central planning socialism is Karl Polanyi’s “great transformation,” the 
“double movement” in which society reacts against innovation and 
reestablishes a suitably embedded and conservative economy under central 
government control.  
By now you will know that I would regard a loss of bourgeois and 
innovative rhetoric as a deep worry, not a hope, and that one purpose of my 
hopeful sestet on “The Bourgeois Era” is to argue against accepting such a 
loss.  We need bourgeois rhetoric.  Bourgeois innovation supported by the 
rhetoric has elevated the poor of the world.  On the scale of actual relief of 
poverty from let-it-rip innovation practiced in England in the nineteenth 
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century and nowadays in places like China and India, the dribbles of personal 
or religious charity, or government-to-government foreign aid, have been 
negligible, and often enough have perversely damaged the poor.  
On the other hand, for the same reasons I have adduced here for not 
believing that efficiency gains are the heart of past economic growth, I do not 
believe that the inefficiencies of welfare states are greatly to be worried over—
so long as innovation is not restricted.  Harberger triangles are not the way to 
wealth, and consequently their loss from economically inefficient 
arrangements is not greatly to be lamented.  The Swedish economy, for all its 
questionable payments to able-bodied people who decide not to work (one out 
of seven Swedes of working age in 2005 were on full disability), retains a good 
deal of innovative dynamism.  The welfare state, we know by now, has not in 
fact been the first step on the road to serfdom.  Not yet at least.  Western 
European social democracy is surely democratic, and (recent anti-immigrant 
movements aside) has obviated the alternative of fascism.62  
Yet reverting to full-scale, central-planning socialism of the sort many 
of the clerisy still pine for on old socialist grounds or on new environmental 
grounds would be a catastrophe, judging from results of actually existing 
socialism that prevailed over large swathes of the world during the twentieth 
century.  It would be scientifically strange to ignore the material and spiritual 
failures of full-blown socialism from 1917 to 1991, or to ignore the present-day 
62
6
  As is argued persuasively by Berman 2006.
58
examples to the contrary in China and India, or to ignore the beginning of it all 
in the rhetorical change on the shores of the North Sea around 1700.  
We need to strengthen the rhetoric of innovation.  That does not mean 
celebrating “greed is good,” which I argued at length in The Bourgeois Virtues 
is a childish and unethical rhetoric—however popular on Wall Street and in 
the Department of Economics.  Strengthening the rhetoric means celebrating 
innovation and respecting market deals.  We must not worship them.  That 
would be in Abrahamic terms idolatry.  But we must not, either, cast them out 
as Baal or Mammon.  
Take for example the fraught issue of CEO compensation in the United 
States.  Richard Nardelli was perhaps not worth every dime of the $50 million 
a year he earned for running Home Depot into the ground, or for the 
comparable amount he got during the descent of Chrysler into bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, few economist can be found who care very much.  We 
economists have long pointed out, and correctly, that CEO pay even of the 
grotesque variety is a trivial percentage of the earnings of the companies 
involved.  And yet in rhetorical terms the non-economists are right.  The 
danger, many people argue, is that the grotesque salaries and the ego-pleasing 
rides on corporate jets and the vacation perks for the family paid for by 
suppliers to the corporation undermine the faith in innovation.  That matters.
*        *       *       *
59
A good deal hinges on whether the new understanding of our economic 
and ethical past that I have argued for here is true or false.  If true, a finding 
that an ethical and rhetorical and ideological change made the modern world 
would be scientifically important.  The Victorian skeptic Alexander Kinglake 
suggested that every church should bear on its front door a large sign, 
“Important If True.”63  So here.  Economic history faces no more important 
question than why industrialization and the reduction of mass poverty first 
started, and especially why it continued.  The continuation made us richer and 
freer and more capable of human achievement than our ancestors.  The latest 
continuation—located most spectacularly in, of all surprising places for it to 
happen, China and India—shows that the whole world can be so.  
For instance, if ideas and ethics and “rhetoric” contributed largely to 
such a happy result then perhaps we should point our social telescopes also 
towards ideas and ethics and rhetoric.  Looking fixedly at trade or imperialism 
or demography or property law—very interesting though all of them are—will 
not do the bulk of the scientific job.  Ideas are the dark matter of history, 
ignored for a century or so 1890-1980.  In those days, I have noted, we were all 
historical materialists.
To be able to detect the dark matter we will need a new, more idea-
oriented economics, which would admit for example that language shapes an 
economy.  For such a humanistic science of economics—explored in this and 
63   Tuckwell 1902, Chp. V.  
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related books, and which a happy few others of us are working on—the 
methods of the human sciences would become as scientifically relevant as the 
methods of mathematics and statistics now properly are.64  Such a new 
economic science would scrutinize literary texts and simulate on computers, 
analyze stories and model maxima, clarify with philosophy and measure with 
statistics, inquire into the meaning of the sacred and lay out the accounting of 
the profane.  The practitioners of the humanities and the social sciences would 
stop sneering at each other and would get down to cooperating for the 
scientific task.
It will not have escaped you that there is of course a political moral, too. 
If the economy were understood as more than Prudence Only, then we could 
re-moralize it.  If innovation were an upshot of desirable ethical changes, then 
we could respect it.  The rhetorical change was itself in part a consequence of 
dignity and liberty.  Dignity and liberty were in turn the result in part of the 
long perfected property rights of Europe, the inheritance from medieval 
liberties of the towns, the competition among states smaller than the Asian 
giants, the decline of serfdom outside of sad Russia, the theory of individual 
dignity in Protestantism and more anciently in all Abrahamic religions, the 
partial liberation of women outside the Mediterranean, the mind-freeing shock 
of the Scientific Revolution to Europe’s relatively primitive science, the uneven 
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fall of religious and secular tyrants just when Asia was abandoning its much 
older tradition of toleration, the emergence of at least a tiny public sphere, the 
careers of quite a few open to talents, the improvements in military technology 
that briefly gave the West (and the Chinese) the weapons to lord it over 
aristocratic warriors of horse-using Steppe or elephant-using empire, the 
techniques of printing on paper imitated and improved from China and the 
Muslim world, making possible a more free periodical press and reasonably 
uncensored theatres and publishing houses (all imperfectly implemented 
1600-1800, but startlingly novel, it seems, on the scale practiced in 
northwestern Europe, even allowing for recent findings that Orientalist 
notions of Asian backwardness are false).  If the technological change was in 
part a consequence of a new dignity and liberty then we free humans could be 
modestly proud of it.  If our bourgeois building was not raised on foundations 
of imperialism or exploitation or unequal trade (excepting the brief reign of 
gunboats, and that in aid of trivial parts of the bourgeois economy), then we 
could admire it, though self-critically.  If serious innovation were not amoral, 
then we could practice ethics more grown-up than a right-wing Greed is Good 
or a left-wing Down With the Bosses.  
Give a woman some rice, and you save her for a day.  That’s the 
simplest form of what Christians flatter themselves by calling “Christian 
charity.”  Give a man some seed and you save him for a year.  That’s the plan 
of investment in capital, tried for decades in foreign aid without a great deal of 
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success.  But give a man and a woman the liberty to innovate, and persuade 
them to admire enterprise and to cultivate the bourgeois virtues, and you save 
them both for a long life of wide scope, and for their children’s and their 
grandchildren’s lives.  That’s the Bourgeois Deal.  When bourgeois values do 
not thrive, the results are poor.  As the economists Virgil Storr and Peter 
Boettke note about the Bahamas, “virtually all models of success to be found 
in the Bahamas’ economic past have to be characterized as piratical,” with the 
result that entrepreneurs there “pursue ‘rents’ rather than [productive] 
profits.”65  Piratical greed, which is to say self-interested prudence without the 
balance of other virtues such as justice, is not good.  And contrary to a 
widespread opinion on left and right, it is not characteristically bourgeois. 
Bernard Mandeville and Ivan Boesky were wrong.  Prudence-only is not the 
virtue of an innovative society.
    *        *        *        *
Yet if innovation, even in a proper context of the virtues, continues to 
be scorned by the clerisy, as it has been by many of our opinion makers now 
for a century and a half, we can if we wish repeat the nationalist and socialist 
horrors of the mid-twentieth century.  If we calculate only the disruptions of a 
pastoral ideal, and neglect the gains from innovation, we can remain poor 
65
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shepherds and dirt farmers, with little scope for intellectual and spiritual 
growth.  If we abandon economic principles in thinking about the 
environment, we can revert to $3 a day, living in huts on a hillock in the 
woods by Walden Pond.  Now in the early twenty-first century we can even if 
we wish add for good measure an anti-bourgeois religiosity, as new as 
airplanes crashing into the World Trade Center and as old as the Sermon on 
the Mount.  
But I suggest that we don’t.  I suggest instead that we recoup the 
bourgeois virtues, which have made us capable, in von Humboldt’s words, of 
developing the highest and most harmonious of our powers to a complete and 
consistent whole.  We’ll need to surrender the economistic idea that 
reshuffling and efficiency made the modern world.  We’ll need instead to 
welcome an economics that properly celebrates ethics, rhetoric, language, 
creativity, innovation.
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